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Global Democracy in a Society of Peoples 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the political structures suitable for the realisation of 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples.  In particular, it explores whether Rawls’ principles and 
fundamental foundations recommend establishing global institutions and, if so, 
whether, and in what sense, these institutions should be democratic.  It is often 
suggested, either implicitly or explicitly, that The Law of Peoples would operate 
through the bilateral and multilateral interactions of, ideally-conceived, nation-
states.  This paper argues, on the contrary, that it would advise a series of 
democratic global institutions.  The case is developed with respect to the idea of a 
global institution with the remit of regulating international trade and applied, in 
the contemporary context, to the World Trade Organisation. 
Keywords: Global democracy; Rawls; The Law of Peoples; World Trade 
Organisation 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls envisages a world of territorially divided groups – ‘peoples’ – 
which ‘have their own internal governments’, arguing that the demands of global morality 
apply to their ‘mutual relations’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 3).  This position has been subjected to 
various challenges.  Some have argued that adopting a more complex, multi-layered system of 
political structures would be more desirable (cf. Pogge, 1994, pp. 85-118; Caney, 2005, pp. 
148-188).  Such proposals often retain a place for the state, but argue for diffusing sovereignty 
across different levels of governance, although some have advocated some form of world 
government (cf. Cabrera, 2004).  Another line of criticism has focused on Rawls’ commentary 
about the place of democracy in his vision of global justice.  Some have argued that the 
aforementioned picture of multi-layered governance should include substantive components 
of democracy both across and beyond borders (cf. Held, 1995).  Others have been critical of 
Rawls’ ideas on democracy within the society of peoples, most significantly in his accrediting 
‘decent hierarchical peoples’ with equal standing in this society (cf. Tan, 2006). 
 Despite this attention, it is interesting to note that there has been relatively little 
examination of precisely what political structures are involved in Rawls’ society of peoples.  
It is common to understand it as involving only nation-states (of some form) interacting 
bilaterally or multilaterally with one another (cf. Pogge, 2006).  It is undeniable that a society 
of peoples does, indeed, involve this feature.  But Rawls explicitly discusses a considerable 
amount more.  He envisages a society of peoples also involving a ‘law…governing the basic 
structure of the relations between peoples’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 33).  It is thought that peoples 
‘should establish new institutions and practices to serve as a kind of confederative centre 
[sic]’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93) and that there will be ‘principles for forming and regulating 
federations (associations) of peoples…and other cooperative institutions’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 
38).  Rawls suggests that we should imagine analogues to the United Nations (Rawls, 1999a, 
p. 36, p. 42, & p. 93), the International Monetary Fund (Rawls, 1999a, p. 84), the World Bank 
(Rawls, 1999a, p. 42 fn. 51), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Rawls, 1999a, 
p. 42 fn. 51).  These institutions may, on certain issues, ‘have the authority to express for the 
society of well-ordered peoples their condemnation of unjust domestic institutions in other 
countries’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 36) and there will be guidelines ‘for specifying various duties 
and obligations’ within them (Rawls, 1999a, p. 86).  It is possible to read these statements as 
suggesting nothing more than a variety of forums in which peoples negotiate.  Yet, it also 
seems possible to read them as suggesting somewhat greater substance to global political 
affairs than mere inter-state relations.  Which is the more plausible reading seems something 
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that can be settled only if we explore more deeply what Rawls had in mind with these 
comments, and, indeed, what is the most defensible conception of a society of peoples. 
 In this paper I hope to provide impetus for such exploration by considering two lines 
of investigation.  I will examine, first, the political structures suitable for society of peoples 
and, second, the question of whether any common centres and global institutions within this 
model should be democratically structured in some way.
1
 
 The merits of exploring these issues should be obvious.  Doing so should provide us 
with a more complete picture of the model of global justice proposed by Rawls.  Developing 
such a picture is useful of its own accord and for determining the strength of challenges to it.  
There are also clear practical merits.  Although our world, undoubtedly, far from resembles 
the conception of the world proposed in The Law of Peoples, the commentary on global 
institutions mentioned above has clear resonance with our contemporary global political 
landscape.  By exploring the dimensions and merits of Rawls’ view, we can also generate 
ideas about how these institutions should be structured in an ideal world and developed 
towards that goal. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  It begins by providing more detail on how a society of 
peoples might be conceived and defends the idea that it should include various global 
institutional structures.  It, then, outlines and defends the claim that these institutions should 
exhibit, at least, two democratic features: (i) equal political power, manifest, in part, through 
(ii) an aggregative voting system.  The argument is brought into focus further by considering 
the application of the ideas to one existing global institution – the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  Finally, the arguments are refined by engaging them with other literature on global 
democracy and WTO appraisal. 
 
THE LAW OF PEOPLES 
 
It is useful to begin by constructing a picture of Rawls’ society of peoples.  Such a picture can 
be developed by outlining of its core moral concerns and asking what political structures seem 
appropriate for upholding these concerns. 
 
Rawlsian global justice 
 
To conceptualise demands of justice, Rawlsian theory begins with an original position.
2
  The 
original position is a hypothetical choice scenario designed to issue fair terms of social 
cooperation between relevant parties.  To use the device, three issues must be clarified.  First, 
it must be determined which parties are relevant to a particular case.  Second, we must specify 
the interests of these parties.  We must ask: what do parties hope to gain in the agreement and 
what do they hope to avoid?  Third, we need to stipulate the conditions of the ‘veil of 
ignorance’.  The veil of ignorance deprives parties of knowledge of certain information in 
their decision-making in order to ensure they are not situated to bias principles towards 
certain features of their scenario.  We must specify which features are unknown. 
 At the global level, Rawls asserts that the relevant parties are representatives of 
‘peoples’, and, initially, only ‘liberal peoples’.  Liberal peoples are territorial entities with 
geographical borders marking their separation from other peoples (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 38-29).  
But they are principally defined by three features.  They are thought to have a reasonably just 
internal structure, some sense of common sentiment between citizens (such as the bonds of 
                                                 
1
 Clearly, other lines of investigation are required in order to form a full picture of a society of peoples and how 
to realise it, but give the focus of common commentary on the idea mentioned in the opening paragraph, these 
two avenues seem a reasonable place to begin. 
2
 The following presents a summary of the original position suitable for the purposes of the paper drawn from 
across Rawls’ work (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 30-35; Rawls, 1999b, pp. 10-19 & pp. 106-168). 
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nationality), and a ‘moral nature’, which implies they are willing to pursue their interests 
within fair terms of cooperation (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 23-25). 
 Such peoples are thought to have three central interests: 
 
(i) They are concerned to protect their territory, political independence, and culture 
(Rawls, 1999a, p. 29 & p. 34). 
(ii) They wish to ensure the security, safety, and welfare of their citizens (Rawls, 1999a, p. 
29 & p. 34). 
(iii)They desire proper self-respect of themselves as a people, involving ‘receiving from 
other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality’ (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 34-
35). 
 
Alongside knowing these interests, peoples in the original position ‘know that reasonably 
favourable [sic] conditions obtain that make constitutional democracy possible’ (Rawls, 
1999a, p. 33).  Yet, in accordance with the aims of the original position structure, they are 
deprived of knowledge of matters that may lead them to bias principles of cooperation in 
certain ways.  They do not know, for example, ‘the size of the territory, or the population, or 
the relative strength of the people…they represent’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 32) or ‘the extent of 
their natural resources, or the level of their economic development’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 33). 
 Thus situated, parties in the original position select principles of global justice.  Rather 
than recount the principles Rawls argues they would select,
3
 it is most useful for the purposes 
here to identify four central components of these principles.  First, we observe a commitment 
to some notion of sovereign dominion insofar as peoples agree to respect one another’s 
freedom and independence and, accordingly, a duty of non-intervention (Rawls, 1999a, p. 37).  
It is necessary to meet certain criteria to qualify for these privileges: a people must not be 
aggressive towards other peoples and it must respect the human rights of its citizens.
4
  But to 
the extent that a society meets these criteria, it becomes a moral requirement that it is treated, 
within these limits, as having sovereign mandate.  Liberal peoples meet these criteria (Rawls, 
1999a, pp. 25-27), as do ‘decent hierarchical societies’ even though they are not liberal 
(primarily insofar as they do not uphold equal rights to political participation and other basic 
liberties) (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 62-70 & pp. 83-84). 
 Second, peoples entitled to this privilege are entitled to be viewed as equals.  That 
such respect is owed between liberal societies follows straightforwardly from their third 
interest noted above – their desire for proper self-respect, which depends, in part, on receiving 
proper respect and recognition of their equality from others.  Rawls also extends this respect 
to decent hierarchical societies (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 84-85).  In essence, it would seem that 
since decent peoples meet the criteria to be admitted to the society of peoples, they too should 
be ascribed and treated as having an interest in self-respect and, accordingly, as entitled to be 
recognised as equals. 
 The third and fourth features concern how The Law of Peoples considers responding to 
peoples acting in ways which mean they do not fulfil the criteria of being a liberal or decent 
society.  Here, Rawls argues that liberal and decent peoples are set a ‘long-term aim…to bring 
all societies to honour [sic] the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing 
of the society of well-ordered peoples’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93).  This aim unfolds in discussion 
of two different cases.  On the one hand, there is the issue of ‘outlaw states’, which are 
outwardly aggressive and do not respect the human rights of their citizens (Rawls, 1999a, p. 
90 & p. 81 respectively).  Liberal and decent societies are encouraged to press for securing 
human rights in such states, which they may pursue through political or economic pressure or, 
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 The list can be found in Rawls (1999a, p. 37). 
4
 Rawls’ specification of human rights can be found in Rawls (1999a, p. 65). 
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if necessary, through sanctions or intervention (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93).  On the other hand is the 
case of ‘burdened societies’, which are failing to establish just or decent institutions because 
they ‘lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, 
the material and technological resources’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 106).  In these cases, liberal and 
decent societies have a ‘duty of assistance’, which requires that they provide aid or political 
inspiration (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 105-106). 
 Based on this, non-exhaustive, overview, Rawls can be thought to endorse the 
following demands of justice for a society of peoples: 
 
1) Sovereign dominion for liberal and decent peoples. 
2) Equal respect between liberal and decent peoples. 
3) Promotion and protection of human rights where they are violated. 
4) Promotion of just domestic institutions where they are absent. 
 
As the description above suggests, these requirements entail various rights and duties.  1 
seems to involve both a right (of sovereignty) and a duty (of non-intervention).  4, meanwhile, 
seems primarily to place duties on liberal and decent peoples, whilst being something similar 
to a right ‘burdened societies’ can claim.  But the crucial point at this stage is that Rawlsian 
global justice does set forth a range of requirements that entail various rights and duties, all of 
which must be upheld in his society of peoples.  It, thus, seems pertinent to ask: what political 
structures would be suitable for upholding these demands? 
 
A ‘society’ of peoples 
 
As noted above, it is often suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, that Rawlsian global 
justice operates in world comprising only peoples.
5
  Of course, peoples clearly are an 
important component of the world order prescribed by Rawls.  However, it also seems clear 
that they are not the only component Rawls advocates, nor should they be so. 
 Rawls makes a number of comments on the further components of his conception of 
the global political order.  Importantly, it is thought to include a number of global institutions.  
One of these serves a primarily political function.  Some analogue of the United Nations, it is 
argued, would ‘serve as a kind of confederative centre [sic] and public forum for [peoples’] 
common opinion and policy toward non-well-ordered regimes’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93).  The 
others mentioned are largely economic in some sense.  An International Monetary Fund is to 
provide assistance to regimes which seek help developing more liberal institutions (Rawls, 
1999a, pp. 84-85).  Meanwhile, analogues of the World Bank and WTO are intended to 
enable peaceful forums for peoples to agree terms of cooperation (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 42-43).  
As Beitz writes, ‘the institutional structure of the Society of Peoples’ seems to involve ‘a 
network of cooperative organizations concerned with matters of security, finance, and trade’ 
(Beitz, 2000, p. 673). 
 It could be suggested that this system remains merely a set of sites for peoples to 
interact.  I am unconvinced by this thought.  Rawls suggests that there is a system of 
‘international law’ that monitors the domains of war and sovereignty (Rawls, 1999a, p. 27).  It 
would be strange to think that a system of international law is embodied by only state tête-à-
têtes.  Rawls also seems to suggest some more centralised aspect when he comments that it is 
through the analogue of the UN that peoples address outlaw states and that, accordingly, this 
institution will ‘have the authority to express for the society of well-ordered people their 
condemnation of unjust domestic institutions in other countries’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 36).  My 
point, though, is not that these institutions must have an independent life.  The point is that 
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there is some form a systematised coordination at the global level.  There will be, Rawls 
suggest, ‘principles for forming and regulating federations (associations) of peoples’ (Rawls, 
1999a, p. 36) and ‘guidelines…for specifying various duties and obligations’ (Rawls, 1999a, 
p. 86).  There is, in other words, a ‘public system of rules’.6  There is some form of global 
institutional setting which specifies, either of its own accord or through agreement between 
peoples, ‘certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden’ and provides for ‘certain 
penalties and defences, and so on, when violations occur’ (Rawls, 1999b, p. 55).  There is, in 
short, not only a set of peoples, but a ‘society’ of peoples. 
 That, at any rate, is how I read the description that Rawls offers.  Perhaps more 
importantly, it also encapsulates what, I think, offers the most plausible understanding of how 
a society of peoples should function.  In the previous subsection, I suggested that Rawls’ 
conception of global justice offers peoples, at least, four requirements which generate various 
rights and duties.  The obvious rationale for conceptualising a society of peoples as a global 
institutional framework involving a public system of rules is that such a system will be 
valuable in terms of upholding these demands.  Two points seem apposite. 
 The first concerns conditions conducive to compliance.  It has been a common theme 
of domestic political thought that an important justification for the state is the value of a 
mechanism for ensuring that individuals comply with their duties of justice.  Some suggest 
that its enforcement capacity is crucial here.
7
  Another position is that they help overcome 
hurdles presented by collective action problems.  They can reduce the epistemic difficulties 
which face individual actors and provide assurance that others are complying.  Such 
arguments are regularly made in defence of global political structures monitoring and 
overseeing the actions of states (cf. McGrew, 2002, p. 272; Caney, 2005, pp. 159-160), and it 
is easy to see why, especially in terms of the commitments Rawls’ mentions above.  It has 
proven extremely difficult to ensure nation-states observe the rights and duties surrounding 
non-intervention in the absence of a more developed global political system (cf. Pogge, 1994, 
p. 103).  Similarly, on the issues of human rights protection and aid to burdened societies, the 
inability of states acting independently to meet the UN demand that they give 0.7% of their 
GDP to such causes is highly telling (UN, 2006). 
 Second, there is a justification from impartiality.  The central idea here was expounded 
by Locke (1993 [1698], pp. 157-163).  It is that individual actors are prone to judge both 
rights and duties with a certain bias towards their own circumstances.  A centralised forum for 
determining and monitoring rules can reduce this bias by acting as a detached, impartial 
arbiter or, if guided by popular will, by balancing individual biases against one another.  They 
offer a scenario in which ‘all private judgement of every particular member being excluded, 
the community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all 
parties’ (Locke, 1993 [1698], pp. 157-158).  The value of this feature of institutions to the 
execution of justice is obvious.  Hoping that each party in the society of peoples respects the 
rights of others and conducts their duties, we should value a system that is able to check the 
tendencies towards bias of all involved, and it would seem that a system with some 
centralised aspect for determining and monitoring rules is valuable to this end.  Locke’s 
rationale provides the intuitive impetus for the idea, but, again, many examples, from 
agreements on climate change to the history of conflict, seem to demonstrate its validity. 
 In short, there seem both exegetical and normative reasons to believe that a society of 
peoples should not comprise only interactions between peoples.  It should involve common 
forums in which ongoing patterns of behaviour and cooperation are discussed and systems of 
rules are developed, specifying which actions are permissible and impermissible and how 
derogations will be addressed.  The setting for The Law of Peoples is a society of peoples. 
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7
 This argument is famously defended in Hobbes (1985 [1651]). 
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GLOBAL DEMOCRACY 
 
The crucial points that have hopefully been established thus far are twofold.  First, Rawlsian 
global justice attributes an important set of rights and duties to peoples.  Second, it seems 
plausible to think that these rights and duties will be upheld, in part, through a set of global 
institutions which will, somehow, determine and monitor relevant rules of conduct.  These 
points seem to raise a related question: how will the relevant rules of conduct be established?    
In this section, I answer this question with the assertion that they should be determined 
democratically. 
 Specifically, I advance two claims.  First, I argue that peoples should have equal 
opportunity for engagement in the process that determines the rules.  Second, I argue for final 
decisions on the rules (or on a group to decide upon the rules) to be made by aggregative 
voting in some form. 
 
Political equality 
 
The first of my arguments primarily aims to defend a foundational idea of democracy: equal 
political power, understood here as equal opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes.  Various institutional arrangements could meet this demand.  But its presence 
distinguishes a system as foundationally democratic, rather than being monarchic or 
autocratic, or, more pertinently, oligarchic or technocratic. 
 The argument I shall employ to defend this position concerns the importance of equal 
political power in conveying the equal respect owed to each member of a society.  The 
argument emerges from commentary on the importance of democracy in Rawls’ work on 
domestic justice.  Here, Rawls places considerable emphasis on each individual’s ‘capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from the public conception of justice which characterises the 
fair terms of social cooperation’ (Rawls, 2005, p. 19).  The idea of individuals having this 
‘sense of justice’ has various dimensions.  Of greatest import here is its role in the equal 
respect owed to each person.  Cohen writes that in Rawlsian thought: 
 
‘Citizens regard one another as equals in matters of social and political justice...in that 
we have, to a sufficient degree, the capacity to understand principles of justice, to offer 
reasons to others in support of them, and to assess the basic institutions within which 
we live and that shape our aims and identity in light of those principles’ (Cohen, 2003, 
p. 107). 
 
In short, being viewed as having a capacity to develop and exercise one’s sense of justice is 
integral to the ideal of moral equality between individuals. 
 This thought connects to the idea of involvement in decision-making processes as 
follows.  Self-respect is regarded as an important good by the individuals in the original 
position because it is a fundamental precondition for all our other ends.  Whether we enjoy 
self-respect is determined, in part, by how others view us and, in particular, whether we are 
seen by them as equal moral persons; whether, that is, ‘we regard one another as having, inter 
alia, the capacity for a sense of justice’ (Cohen, 2003, p. 109).  A crucial demonstration that 
we are seen as capable of forming and living by a sense of justice is the granting of 
responsibility for making judgements and influencing policy on matters of rights and fair 
distribution.  In Cohen’s words, ‘when others respect me as an equal, they confirm my sense 
of my own value’, and ‘they show that respect by acknowledging and protecting my right to 
bring my sense of justice to bear on public affairs’ (Cohen, 2003, p. 109).  Moreover, it seems 
important that it is equal political power that is granted.  Rawls utilises the phrase ‘the fair 
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value of political liberty’ to convey the idea that ‘the worth of the political liberties to all 
citizens…must be approximately equal, or at least sufficiently equal in the sense that 
everyone has a fair opportunity…to influence the outcome of political decisions’ (Rawls, 
2005, p. 327).  The rationale for this commitment can be observed by considering the 
implications of its counterpoint.  Unequal opportunities for participation suggest that the input 
of some is more valuable than others and that we are not genuinely committed to treating each 
party equally as holding a sense of justice.  So, it is through granting the opportunity to 
participate that the capacity to develop and exercise a sense of justice is acknowledged and it 
is in granting it equally that their equality is recognised. 
 Although there are obvious differences, a similar case can be made in relation to a 
society of peoples.  It was noted above that peoples are thought to have a ‘moral nature’.  
Rawls writes that ‘like citizens in domestic society’ they are ‘both reasonable and rational’, 
willing ‘to cooperate on fair terms’ and willing to ‘honour [sic] these terms when assured that 
other peoples will do so as well’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 25).  These descriptions seem grounds for 
thinking that peoples be held to have an understanding of fair terms of conduct that can be 
developed and honed, as having, in other words, a ‘sense of justice’.  It was also observed that 
one of the fundamental interests of peoples is the desire for proper self-respect and, 
consequently, the interest in ‘receiving from other peoples a proper respect and recognition of 
their equality’ (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 34-35).  Given the parallels, it does not seem unreasonable 
to draw similar connections between these ideas to assert that peoples should be seen as equal, 
inter alia, as having the capacity for a sense of justice and the self-respect they can properly 
feel will derive, in part, from the equal recognition of this capacity. 
 If this understanding of peoples is maintained, a similar argument can be made for the 
importance of equal opportunity for involvement in decision-making.  As in the case for 
individuals, it would seem that the granting of political power is the proper acknowledgement 
of a people’s capacity to develop and exercise a sense of justice and the granting of this power 
equally is the proper recognition of equality between peoples with this capacity.  It seems 
similarly plausible to think that if global public rules are formed in a manner that does not 
give each people an equal opportunity to influence the determination of these rules, we have 
not respected their equal standing as actors with a sense of justice.  What would respect this 
equality is granting peoples the fair value of political liberty in global decision-making. 
 
Aggregative voting 
 
While the previous argument focused on a foundational idea of democracy, my second 
argument develops the position towards a particular institutional characteristic: a role in 
decision-making for some form of aggregative voting.  Again, various models – issue-specific 
referenda or elected leaders, majority rule or proportional representation, and so on – may 
meet this requirement.  Similarly, I do not mean to suggest aggregative voting is the only 
important element of a democracy.  The argument’s main focus is to demarcate my proposal 
from a certain alternative: final decision by, passive or active, consensus.  Two arguments 
give reason to favour the aggregative voting option. 
 First, there are constraints set by the number of participants.
8
  Essentially, the split 
between aggregative voting and decision by consensus regards how many parties must agree 
to a proposal for it to be deemed approved.  Consensus requires unanimity, whereas 
aggregative systems require something short of that, perhaps a majority or a super-majority or 
merely the best-placed candidate.  One merit of the latter is that decisions can resort to 
aggregation of votes.  To be sure, it is valuable to include, say, deliberation in forming the 
available options.  But it is possible, at some juncture, to deem the time for deliberation at an 
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end and for the decision to be made through parties inputting their preferences and calculating 
the numbers.  Unanimity can rarely be achieved in this fashion.  Typically it requires other 
methods.  On the one hand, if we follow active consent – the requirement that all parties 
expressly agree – negotiations and discussion can take place with the aim of formulating an 
agreement that suits all parties.  But this procedure requires considerable, often impractical, 
time and resources when the numbers involved are anything other than very small.  On the 
other hand, negotiation can proceed via passive consent – when no present party dissents.  
This process can be more practical, but only with an alternative price.  To wit, if negotiations 
proceed without the inclusion of various parties.  The relevance and significance of this 
dilemma depends somewhat on context.  Yet even at the general level one can see how these 
problems arise when numbers reach even modest levels, such as >50 participants, in 
environments where difficult decisions need to be made regularly.  And I suspect that Rawls’ 
society of peoples meets these conditions.  Even restricting the count to liberal and decent 
peoples, it seems likely that a Rawlsian global decision-making will involve numbers of this 
kind and it is hard to believe that there will be a small amount to decide given the divisiveness 
of topics like intervention, human rights protection, and aid.  In such circumstances, there 
seems some reason to think that an aggregative voting system is a more viable way to realise 
equal political power than consensus-building. 
 Second, there is an important point about the relation between decision-making 
systems and the likelihood of certain outcomes.  The concern is that realising progressive 
political outcomes, such as those which involve duties upon actors that can bear the cost of 
helping protect human rights or providing aid, is more viable in a decision-making system that 
better opens the possibility of some parties being made worse-off.  An aggregative system 
allows for the possibility that those who would rather not have further duties bestowed on 
them can be outvoted.  It is much less clear how accessible this possibility should be deemed 
under a unanimity requirement.  The difficulty is captured by Pettit: 
 
‘If the common interest is to be advanced…the decision-making procedure has to 
allow for some people to be treated less well than others.  And a vetoing scheme 
would hardly fit the bill, since it would enable those from every quarter to rule out 
anything that damaged them’ (Pettit, 1999, p. 179). 
 
Of course, a veto also gives power for those to whom duties are owed to block decisions.  But 
this power can serve only to maintain the status quo.  It is unable to force progressive steps if 
another actor dissents.  The relevance of this issue is also partly an empirical matter – it turns 
on how actors respond to different systems – and we must remember that Rawlsian peoples 
are motivated by a sense of justice.  But we do have evidence to affirm the comparative merit 
of a voting procedure that can be drawn from existing supranational governance literature.  It 
has been noted, for example, that within the European Union (EU) the prospect of voting ‘is 
like the sword of Damocles hanging over the negotiating table’, pushing even powerful 
members to respond more adequately to the interests of weaker parties to ensure requisite 
support (Bal, 2004, pp. 129-130).  And although Rawlsian peoples may not mirror real world 
actors, we must be aware of both the tendency towards bias and apprehension about the 
choices of others and the fact that such peoples do retain components of self-interest in their 
actions.  Thus, even in a world of largely reasonable actors, there seems value to a mechanism 
that can check these tendencies and allows progressive steps be made more simply. 
 
An initial sketch 
 
Now, even a minimalist understanding of democracy involves more than has been asserted 
above and many details have not been considered.  But I take it that what has been argued 
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gives some rationale for the global institutions in a society of peoples to be democratic in, at 
least, the senses suggested.  In a system that has a set of public rules for coordinating 
interaction and upholding the rights and duties of a society of peoples, the demand for 
equality suggests peoples should have an equal platform for participation in determining those 
rules.  Practicality gives some reason for this equal political power to be manifest through 
aggregative voting, as does the interest in the realisation of a progressive system that can 
exact the kinds of rights and duties Rawlsian global justice requires. 
 
DEMOCRACY AT THE WTO 
 
In order to make the above arguments more vivid and consider some of their implications, it 
seems useful to explore an instance of their application.  Both the merits of the arguments and 
how they can be used to consider reform of our existing global architecture can be brought 
forth by reflecting on the case of the WTO.  As noted above, Rawls conceptualises a place for 
an institution similar to the WTO.  Rawls’ suggestion seems to be that its purpose would be 
primarily to help establish appropriate rules for global trade.  But it does not seem incoherent 
to think that it could also have some role in assisting the promotion and protection of human 
rights or just institutions if these goals could usefully be funnelled through the structures of 
the global economy.  It, thus, seems a reasonable case for testing the appropriate format for 
institutions tasked with upholding Rawlsian global justice. 
 The dimensions of WTO decision-making are roughly as follows.  It is a one-member-
one-vote organisation with an arrangement for various forms of majoritarian decisions.  
However, the institution does not use these procedures.  Agreements are reached by 
consensus-building.  They are formed by a group of ‘interested’ parties convening – in, so-
called, ‘Green Rooms’ – to discuss the terms of trade in some particular area and a decision is 
deemed to have been reached when no present party dissents (Narlikar, 2002; Ehlermann & 
Ehring, 2005, pp. 54-56). 
 There are three pertinent problems with this system.  First, it does not provide all 
parties with equal opportunity to participate.  The passive consensus model has the problem of 
being a presence-dependent decision procedure.  If a party is not present, agreements are 
formed without their contribution, a difficulty that has confronted countries unable to afford 
permanent representation in Geneva or that cannot send large delegations or afford specialists 
to ensure they attend all discussions relevant to their interests (Narlikar, 2002, p. 175).  
Moreover, even when in attendance, less powerful states often experience a disadvantage 
compared to states that have greater resources to prepare their negotiation platforms and 
techniques and which such states often use to induce agreement.  What follows from these 
experiences, often, is a feeling that they are not treated as equal partners in negotiation 
(Narlikar, 2002, pp. 175-176; Jawara & Kwa, 2003). 
 Second, there is evidence of the dilemma between capacity constraints and inclusion.  
The consensus-building model worked reasonably when there were far fewer states involved, 
but now that WTO numbers and the quantity of issues on the agenda are higher, the viability 
of reaching an inclusionary consensus is much reduced (Schott & Watal, 2000; Ehlermann & 
Ehring, 2005, p. 68).  Larger-scale negotiations have been extremely protracted and often 
inconclusive while the areas in which progress has been made are cases where Green Room 
discussions proceeded with a group of countries far short of the number that have a genuine 
interest in the area of discussion (Schott & Watal, 2000; Keohane & Nye, 2000, pp. 7-8). 
 Third, the actions of some states in consensus-oriented negotiation have served to 
prevent more progressive agreements being reached.  For example, in negotiations 
surrounding the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and public health – 
which concerned how the former would impact the (right to) health, and, indeed, life, of many 
individuals – ‘consensus could not be reached because one single Member felt unable to 
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abandon its resistance against the proposed draft waiver’ (Ehlermann & Ehring, 2005, p. 64).  
Similarly, ‘after launching the Tokyo and Uruguay rounds, powerful countries often blocked a 
consensus to advance initiatives by weak countries when they were introduced for formal 
action in the relevant negotiating committee’ (Steinberg, 2002, p. 355).  Various other 
examples can also be given in support of this point (cf. Steinberg, 2002, pp. 345-349; 
Ehlermann & Ehring, 2005, pp. 64-68). 
In contrast, there seems some reason to believe that the alternative structures I 
proposed above would combat these problems.  The idea of the fair value of political liberty 
would seem to imply equalising the opportunity for countries to have input into agreement 
forming at the institution, perhaps by providing resources to bolster the delegation size and 
capacities of developing countries (Narlikar, 2002, p. 180).  Developing such provision is 
already underway in the WTO’s recent efforts on ‘building trade capacity’ (WTO, 2013) and 
furthering this programme would go some distance to removing the inegalitarian nature of the 
decision-making processes and removing the source of feelings of unequal respect. 
Final decisions by aggregative vote could be implemented in various ways.  One 
possibility is that existing protocol for decision by (qualified) majority vote could be utilised 
more regularly (Ehlermann & Ehring, 2005, pp. 71-72).  An alternative suggestion is the 
formation of a steering committee that would attempt to formulate agreements on behalf of 
member states (Schott & Watal, 2000).  Such a committee could be elected via some system 
of representation.  Either of these models would be likely to improve matters in the WTO in 
two respects.  They would offer practical ways to ensure equal political control over decisions 
despite large numbers of participants and issues.  In addition, the shadow of a vote would 
provide greater incentives to reach agreements that advanced the rights of developing 
countries and their citizens (Ehlermann & Ehring, 2005, pp. 72-73) and, in the final analysis, 
a means of forcing such decisions through that is problematic under the consensus system.
9
 
There are clearly other reforms that would be valuable at the WTO.  As I noted in the 
previous section, I do not mean to argue that incorporating an aggregative vote would be all 
that an interest in democratic values or WTO legitimacy would involve.  Some prominent 
suggestions in literature are that crucial reform should focus on improving transparency, 
allowing publics to be better informed and better situated to hold their representatives to 
account (Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 12) and that we should increase involvement of civil 
society groups, perhaps to aid the cause of transparency or because it can improve 
deliberations or cross-learning (Slaughter, 2004, p. 162; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006, p. 430).  
I see my proposals as complementing these ideas.  Increased transparency, for example, 
would aid equal respect and, conversely, moving negotiations away from closed-door Green 
Rooms towards voting structures would increase the pressure on governments to make their 
arguments clearer and more accessible to a wider audience. 
It is true that some of those who advocate these reforms juxtapose them with greater 
democratisation (cf. Keohane et al., 2009, pp. 9-18).  However, their main focus here is to 
argue against greater public involvement on the grounds that it may allow special interest 
groups to obstruct progress on long-term public goods, such as freer trade.  This position and 
its justification do not stand against the proposal I have made for greater equality between 
states and the manifestation of this equality through an aggregative vote.  Indeed, as my 
earlier arguments suggest, there may, again, be reason to believe that the aggregative vote 
component accords with the motivations of such arguments on the grounds that it may be 
helpful for circumventing other factions which obstruct progressive agreements. 
                                                 
9
 It is perhaps worth noting here that if there is fear such structures may also leave open the possibility that 
powerful states organise a majority to force regressive agreements, we could supplement the voting system with 
some continued form of veto power for developing countries, as suggested in by Margaret Moore (2006, pp. 37-
38). 
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In short, I contend that the WTO case supports both the contentions of the previous 
section.  Of course, we must remain careful about what we infer from real world politics 
about a society of peoples.  There would clearly be other differences between the two that 
could alter the realities and value of various institutional features.  But it is not unreasonable 
to think that our experience of global political structures contributes some information on how 
such institutions will most appropriately operate.  The case of the WTO, I submit, is both an 
example of the problems with a lack of democracy between peoples and evidence that such 
institutions, to be most valuable in terms of pursuing Rawlsian global justice, should work 
towards ensuring equal opportunities for participation amongst their members and should 
utilise recourse to aggregative voting to make final decisions on the rules. 
 
REFINING 
 
The arguments above have, hopefully, set forth a positive statement on the value of global 
democracy in a society of peoples and begun to sketch how the idea should be conceived.  I 
do not have space to address all possible objections and details here.  But I will use the 
remaining space to address some of the most obvious challenges to it and use these questions 
to refine certain elements.  In doing so, my main focus is the more abstract analysis of the 
society of peoples, but I will continue to engage the ideas with practice at the WTO in order to 
draw relevant evidence and consider the application of the ideas. 
 
Sovereign equality 
 
The first worry is that global democracy would clash with the sovereign equality of peoples.  
It was noted above that peoples have an interest in securing their political and cultural 
independence.  It might be thought that deference to a global institution in which binding 
decisions are made would be in tension with these interests.  There may also be concern that 
such institutions would limit the space for national democratic decisions.  Both worries are 
cited as reasons against moving away from the consensus system at the WTO (cf. Steinberg, 
2002, p. 361; Warwick Commission, 2007, p. 29) and it might be thought that they would 
readily exist among Rawlsian peoples. 
 I have three responses.  First, whilst sovereignty of some form is an important value in 
Rawls’ Law of Peoples, it should not be understood in the traditional sense.  As noted above, 
sovereignty here is understood more as a privilege than a right, limited to some extent by the 
demands of global justice.  It is quite proper, Rawls writes, that ‘international law…tends to 
limit a state’s right to wage war…and…to restrict a state’s right to internal sovereignty’ 
(Rawls, 1999a, p. 27).  This restriction on sovereignty, Rawls thinks, is quite compatible with 
the interest of peoples.  Second, it is worth noting that the extent to which a people’s 
independence is preserved is not merely a matter of formalised institutions.  It is, in part, an 
empirical question regarding what structures best preserve independence, and it may be that 
collaborating within certain supra-national organisations is what is best.  Pettit argues along 
these lines that, given the threat offered by, for example, corporations or financial institutions, 
it is plausible to believe that cooperation within global institutions is the best mechanism for 
securing sovereignty in a globalised world (Pettit, 2010, pp. 70-94).  Finally, we can limit the 
possible tension between global democracy and sovereignty by organising our political 
system to reflect these concerns somewhat.  For example, we can adopt a fairly strict principle 
of subsidiarity, similar to the EU system, regarding which issues are addressed at the global 
level and we can allow peoples considerable flexibility in the methods of implementation of 
many requirements.  Together, these comments hopefully offer enough to suggest that some 
form federalist or confederalist governance structure should be compatible with a concern for 
the kind of sovereignty entailed in a society of peoples.  Rawls, at least, seemed to think they 
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would be compatible (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93 & p. 111).  At any rate, they should be sufficient to 
dispel the thought that the two are necessarily in tension. 
 
People and peoples 
 
A second concern regards the focus in my arguments on peoples.  There are two angles from 
which this focus may be deemed troubling.  It may be suggested that it neglects the 
fundamental concern for the existence of democratic relations between individuals worldwide 
(cf. Held, 1995).  It may also be wondered how my position addresses the non-ideal aspects of 
Rawlsian theory.  Not all peoples will not be ‘well-ordered’, but both my arguments on global 
democracy and my application to the WTO rather bypassed this issue.  It might be wondered 
how my proposals will address these groups.
10
 
In response to the first worry, I make two points.  First, nothing I have argued would 
negate the possibility of global citizen parliament(s).  Indeed, one value of such an 
arrangement might be to realise a useful balance of powers between individuals and national 
governments, giving individuals some avenue for holding their representatives to account 
through post-national courts, for example.  I do not think this idea contradicts my proposals.  
Nevertheless, it seems worth stressing, second, that we should not overstate the importance of 
directly involving individuals in global politics, at least from within the parameters that I have 
developed here.  If the aim is to ensure individuals have some form of involvement in the 
structures that govern their lives, it should go some way to meeting this goal in my model to 
ensure that individuals have some control over their national representatives. 
This response, however, leads us directly to the second concern raised above: how to 
address non-well-ordered peoples.  On this issue, it is important to stress that the concern 
arises only within a non-ideal world.  This seems important because whatever comment is 
offered on it, the objection cannot undermine the case for global democracy within the society 
of well-ordered peoples.  It is important also because it directs us to consider the issue from 
the perspective of the general aim Rawls’ sets for non-ideal circumstances: ‘to bring all 
societies to honour [sic] the Law of Peoples and to become full members in good standing of 
the society of well-ordered peoples’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 93).  It should be clear that how to 
achieve this aim is, in large part, an empirical matter.  What it requires depends on what will 
effectively push all peoples to be well-ordered.  From this perspective, it becomes plausible to 
think that including even non-well-ordered peoples within global democracy is an acceptable 
position.  Rawls was distinctly keen on thinking that a strategy of incorporation and friendly 
pressure was a good approach, at least in a number of cases (cf. Rawls, 1999a, pp. 108-111).  
There is also some evidence to support this idea from the context of application discussed 
above.  Under Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, countries can 
voluntarily establish a General System of Preferences.
11
  These agreements establish a 
preferential terms of trade for developing countries, usually made conditional upon the latter 
meeting certain criteria, usually human rights obligations, including, at times, democratic 
standards.  Of course, whether this strategy is optimal for improving human rights respect or 
democracy in less-well-ordered peoples is debatable.  But there is enough evidence to suggest 
that there are a variety of mechanisms for addressing the worry over such states that operate 
within the institutional context.  Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to propose that the ideas 
on global democracy detailed above might be suitably applied to an all-inclusive version of, 
                                                 
10
 Although the main focus here is the society of peoples, it is worth noting that the worry over non-democratic 
states is used as an argument against global democracy in some literature on the WTO (cf. Buchanan & 
Keohane, 2006, p. 416). 
11
 For details see Bartels (2005, pp. 463-487). 
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say, the WTO provided that appropriate internal mechanisms are designed for moving 
towards a world in which it more accurately resembles a society of peoples. 
A final variant of the above concerns is the claim that democracy is a problematic 
ideal in the global context because there is no reasonable way to apply the idea of one-
member-one-vote.  It is argued that one-individual-one-vote gives disproportionate weight to 
large countries, while one-country-one-vote gives disproportionate weight to small countries 
(Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 12; Kahler, 2004, p. 136).  Such criticisms seem overly hasty, 
though.  We often accept disproportionate weighting in domestic democracy – for example, in 
unequally sized regional groups electing the same number of representatives – when doing so 
helps improve the overall balance of interest representation or the likelihood good outcomes 
(Dworkin, 2000, pp. 200-204).  Moreover, it does seem that various intermediary grounds 
could be considered, such as the model incorporated in The Lisbon Treaty (Article 16), which 
requires the support of 55% of member-states representing 65% of the population.  The merit 
of such a system is that it ensures decisions balance the interests of large and small states, 
allowing neither to impose decisions too easily on others.  Of course, our choice of specific 
political structures must depend on various issues, but, again, hopefully these ideas are 
sufficient to show that global democracy is not necessarily in tension with allotting the 
appropriate place for persons or (different types of) peoples. 
 
Free and equal peoples 
 
A third issue for discussion regards Rawls’ own views on democracy at the global level.  
Strictly, Rawls says nothing for or against the global institutions he advocates being 
democratic (Rawls, 1999a, pp. 42-43).  But, as noted above, some commentators have thought 
Rawls did not place great value on democracy in the global realm.  Accordingly, it might 
seem that he would have reasons to reject my arguments.  Perhaps the most likely source of 
worry would focus on Rawls’ claim that principles of justice should be founded on ideas 
common in the political culture of relevant actors (cf. Rawls, 2005, pp. 13-15).  The difficulty 
this position may create for my argument is focused by Joshua Cohen’s arguments on a 
human right to democracy (Cohen, 2006).  The point is as follows.  The value of democracy 
is, at least in part, a product of the idea that parties to a certain set of collective decisions 
should be seen as ‘free and equal’.  Following Rawls’ thought about the foundations of 
justice, it is possible to mobilise this notion in favour of democracy in liberal societies, 
because in such societies there is some sense of shared belief in it.  However, matters are 
more problematic when the scope of justice is expanded, since there are many societies in 
which it is not shared.  If the demands of justice are supposed to supervene, in some way, on 
ideas affirmed in common culture, democracy cannot be deemed a moral demand in such 
contexts.  Such a case can be made against a human right to democracy.  It would seem 
possible that the same concern might apply to my arguments if the notion of ‘free and equal’ 
peoples is not shared across societies.
12
 
My response to this objection is to deny both of its premises.  First, it seems difficult 
to believe that any substantive notion of consensus can figure as a foundational element of 
theorising about justice.  As Moellendorf writes: ‘a theory of justice is supposed to include an 
account of what people are entitled to, not what many people believe people are entitled to’ 
(Moellendorf, 2002, p. 13).  The alternative, I think, is to ground arguments of justice on 
fundamental values, but if this move is made, the fact of disagreement between cultures 
cannot have any bearing on their validity.  Second, we can also deny the claim that the idea of 
peoples as ‘free and equal’ is not shared across borders, at least in this case.  In the theoretical 
                                                 
12
 It is worth noting that the idea of utilising voting within the WTO is rejected by the Warwick Commission for 
reasons along these lines (Warwick Commission, 2007, p.29). 
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argument I offered, it was stipulated ex hypothesi that (qualifying) peoples view each other as 
free and equal, in this case as equals in holding a sense of justice.  Moreover, there is some 
evidence that such beliefs have currency in practice even amongst a much wider range of 
states.  Indeed, it was reference to the claims of many of those who might be thought to object 
to this value that made the case for improving WTO democracy so compelling.  My sense, 
therefore, is that the concern simply does not have application in the context of discussion. 
 
Affinity 
 
The next objection to consider concerns affinity between parties comprising the demos.  
Democracy, it has been argued, requires some form of shared sentiment, such as nationality or 
common political culture, because this ensures the bonds between co-members are sufficient 
for those who lose elections or referenda to accept and abide by the will of the majority.  The 
absence of such commonalities and solidarity at the global level, the argument continues, 
makes the idea of global democracy problematic (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 226-277 & pp. 238-
240; Miller, 2010, pp. 145-146 & pp. 149-151).
13
 
 I have two responses.  First, it is unclear how persuasive this criticism should be 
deemed in any conception of democracy.  Ultimately, it is an empirical claim regarding the 
possibility of building sufficient affinity between parties to sustain democratic values.  It 
seems intuitive to think that size and diversity will create problems in this regard.  But the 
available empirical evidence contradicts this intuition.  India formed a political system that is, 
at least, recognisably democratic amidst considerable diversity (Koenig-Archibugi, 2011, pp. 
530-531).  More generally, in the largest empirical study of this issue to date, Fish and Brooks 
find no evidence that fractionalisation, at least along linguistic, ethnic, or religious lines, has a 
negative impact on the prospects of democracy (Fish & Brooks, 2004, pp. 156-166).  Such 
research can be challenged and, anyway, it does not test hypotheses at the global level.  But 
given that the available data suggests the issue of affinity is not as problematic as it intuitively 
may seem, there is more reason for optimism than pessimism. 
Second, it should be noted that the question of affinity is not unique to democracy.  It 
was argued above that a society of peoples requires some system of global public rules, 
asking a diverse array of actors to observe certain patterns of behaviour, including meeting the 
duties The Law of Peoples prescribes.  It seems reasonably clear that the motivation to abide 
by such rules or norms will require at least as much affinity as abiding by the decisions of 
global institutions.  Both, ultimately, rely on a willingness to accept abiding by rules even if 
they are not in one’s self-interest or are different to what one desires.  Indeed, it seems 
plausible to think that observing these rules will be all the more acceptable to peoples if they 
know that the rules were devised through a fair process. 
 
Deadlock 
 
To bring the paper to a close, I wish to address one final concern that lies on the border 
between ideal theory and progress towards its realisation.  The worry is that departures from 
consensus decision-making might be futile or counterproductive.  It has been suggested that 
the WTO is under threat of collapse if changes of these kinds are considered, given the 
already-existing tendency of wealthier states to operate bilaterally or regionally when they do 
not reach the agreements they desire (Kahler, 2004, pp. 149-150; Warwick Commission, 
2007, p. 29).  It might similarly be thought that even Rawlsian peoples might be resistant to 
forgoing the possibility of veto power in such an organisation.  
                                                 
13
 Again, although my focus here is the society of peoples, it is worth noting that the same concern has been 
raised regarding the idea of greater democratisation of the WTO (cf. Keohane & Nye, 2000, p. 11). 
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 It seems to deflect the immediate practical worry somewhat to highlight the following.  
Many global institutions already face difficulties with deadlock (cf. Narlikar, 2010a).  The 
Doha Development Round has been on-hold for over a decade at this point and shows little 
sign of resolution.  With this problem in the background, the WTO is already suffering from 
inertia and a tendency to form agreements outside its domain.  Perhaps changes would lead to 
more of these problems in some areas, but resolve them in others.  There is some reason to 
believe that aggregative voting procedures would actually enhance the ability of the WTO to 
circumvent certain quagmires caused by pluralism in consensus-based decision-making (cf. 
Narlikar, 2010b, pp. 722-723).  Given these considerations, it is unclear how troubling 
worries over deadlock under alternative arrangements should be deemed.   
 My sense, therefore, is that the only enduring difficulty is that ‘big powers’ will be 
resistant or will exit if they are subjected to rules they dislike.  But this worry cannot be given 
too much recognition.  One would hope that well-ordered Rawlsian peoples would not be so 
impervious to changes advancing the cause of justice and even if so, we seem to face the same 
kind of problem as the worry of states seceding from the union when the abolition of slavery 
was advocated or continued concerns that the wealthy will emigrate if we advocate higher 
taxes and more egalitarian distribution.  Such worries matter, but only as reason to move 
strategically in how we promote and realise the agenda.  They do not question the justice of it 
or, consequently, give any reason for it not to be followed.  If global democracy is what a 
society of states requires of an institution like the WTO, it is this goal we should, somehow, 
pursue. 
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